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We present an experimental realization of a quantum digital signature protocol which, together with a standard
quantum key distribution link, increases transmission distance to kilometre ranges, three orders of magnitude
larger than in previous realizations. The bit-rate is also significantly increased compared with previous quantum
signature demonstrations. This work illustrates that quantum digital signatures can be realized with optical
components similar to those used for quantum key distribution, and could be implemented in existing optical
fiber networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Signature schemes are widely used in electronic communication to guarantee the authenticity and transferability of
messages. Transferability means that a signed message is unlikely to be accepted by one recipient and, if forwarded,
subsequently rejected by another recipient [1]. This property distinguishes signature schemes from message authenti-
cation schemes, in which there is no transferability requirement. Transferability is closely related to non-repudiation;
message repudiation would mean that a sender can successfully deny having sent a message they really did send. The
most widespread signature schemes are the public key protocols RSA [2], DSA [3] and ECDSA [4], in which security
depends on the computational difficulty of factorising large numbers or finding discrete logarithms. Since the secu-
rity of such schemes is not information-theoretic, but relies on computational assumptions, it can be retrospectively
affected by future advances in technology or the discovery of efficient algorithms. In fact, all of the above schemes
are known to be insecure against an adversary with a quantum computer [5].
The security of quantum digital signatures (QDS) [6, 7], on the other hand, is information-theoretic, guaranteed
by the laws of quantum mechanics to be secure against an adversary with infinite computational capabilities. This is
a potentially significant advantage. There also exist unconditionally secure “classical” digital signature schemes [8].
In addition to requiring pairwise secret classical communication channels (which could be achieved using QKD), the
scheme by Chaum and Roijakkers [9] requires an authenticated broadcast channel (a significantly more challenging
prospect), and the one by Hanaoka et al. [10] is phrased in terms of a third party, trusted by all participants. Such
assumptions are not straightforward and are not required in QDS protocols. Pairwise message authentication can
be efficiently implemented with information-theoretic security using short pre-shared keys [11] and is not equivalent
with the stronger assumption of an authenticated broadcast channel. Further, information-theoretically secure secret
classical channels can be generated using QKD. Therefore, even in terms of required resources, if the secret shared
keys are generated using QKD, QDS schemes are no more demanding than the “classical” unconditionally secure
signature schemes.
Although QDS has been successfully realized in the lab between three parties, a sender Alice and two receivers
Bob and Charlie [12, 13], the transmission distance for these realizations was limited to the order of meters. The
earliest versions of QDS protocols [6, 12] also required long-term quantum memory [14–17] to store the signature
states at the receivers, making full implementation difficult with currently available technology. The requirement for
quantum memory is removed if the recipients directly measure the quantum states sent by Alice, for example using
unambiguous state elimination (USE) [18, 19], and then storing only the classical measurement outcomes [13, 18].
However, these QDS schemes still relied on a multiport to guarantee non-repudiation, comprising two intertwined
interferometers controlled locally by Bob and Charlie. The multiport design required internal delays equal to the
link length between Bob and Charlie, as well as introducing unavoidable additional high optical loss, restricting the
practical transmission distance to approximately 5 m [12, 13].
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II. DESCRIPTION OF METHOD
For QDS to be useful in real world applications, protocols which allow for higher transmission rate and greater
distance between parties must be developed and demonstrated experimentally. In this paper we present an experimental
realization of a key part of such a protocol, along the lines of new QDS protocols in [20]. The experimental system,
outlined in Figure 1 and described in greater detail in the Appendix, uses similar optical components to those currently
employed in phase-encoded QKD experiments [21–25], thus greatly improving the practicality of QDS.
Signature protocols have two stages, a distribution stage and a messaging stage. The scheme is set up in the
distribution stage, to enable signed messages to be sent and received in the messaging stage, which could occur at
any future date. An outline of the protocol will be presented here with a more complete description in the Appendix.
We will describe how to sign a 1-bit message m; longer messages may be sent by suitably iterating this procedure.
In the distribution stage, Alice chooses two random sequences of L phase-encoded coherent states, one sequence for
each possible message, 0 or 1. Increasing the length L of the sequence will increase the security of the scheme. The
security also depends on other parameters, such as the mean photon number per pulse |α|2 and on imperfections in
the setup [20]. Alice chooses her quantum states randomly from a known alphabet of non-orthogonal quantum states,
in our case the four phase-encoded states |α〉, |αeipi/2〉, |αeipi〉, and |αe3ipi/2〉, relative to a common phase reference.
She keeps the complete classical description of the two sequences secret; this constitutes her “private key”. Non-
orthogonal quantum states cannot be perfectly distinguished from each other, so only Alice can know her full private
key. The phase reference pulse in our implementation is strong, so that tampering with it could in principle be detected
by performing state tomography.
Alice sends one copy of each sequence of coherent quantum states to both Bob and Charlie, through separate
quantum channels. Bob and Charlie measure the received coherent states, in our case using quantum USE [13, 19, 20],
ruling out zero, one or more of the four possible phases for each position in each sequence of states. Bob and Charlie
perform the measurements by combining the suitably adjusted reference pulses with the signal pulses using two beam
splitters, one for each non-orthogonal phase pair in the four-state alphabet. Each detection event eliminates one of
the four possible states sent by Alice. In Figure 1, the phase of the reference state entering beam splitter 2 at Bob is
set so that he can eliminate the 0 and pi phases, and the phase at beam splitter 3 is set to eliminate the pi/2 and 3pi/2
phases. From the detection statistics, one can calculate the conditional probabilities for Bob to eliminate each of the
four states, given that Alice sent a particular state. An example of this so-called cost matrix is illustrated in Figure 2(a)
for |α|2 = 0.5.
Bob and Charlie now each have a measurement record for the sequences sent by Alice. They then both randomly
and independently choose half of their measurement outcomes to forward to the other recipient. They keep secret
from Alice which measurement outcomes are forwarded and which are kept. This last step is not implemented in our
present setup, but could be achieved using a standard QKD link. Employing a standard QKD link does not have an
impact on the maximum transmission distance or security level of the system and does not add further complications
in the security analysis. This is because it is only used to secure the classical processing after the coherent states
have been transmitted and measured. The random forwarding procedure replaces the symmetrising multiport in earlier
implementations and ensures that Bob and Charlie obtain the same measurement statistics irrespective of what states
Alice sends them. This is true even for the most general cheating strategies by Alice, which could involve entangled
states. A dishonest Alice could attempt repudiation, that is, deny having sent a message that she actually did send. If
the whole signature scheme is to have information-theoretic security, then a secret classical communication channel
with information-theoretic security is needed for forwarding the measurement results, since otherwise security against
repudiation would not be information-theoretic. At the end of the distribution stage, Bob and Charlie should each be
left with different and incomplete descriptions of the signature sent by Alice, which are kept until the messaging stage.
In the messaging stage, Alice chooses a message m and sends it together with her corresponding private key, that
is, the classical description of the corresponding sequence of quantum states, to the intended recipient, say Bob. All
communication during the messaging stage takes place over pairwise authenticated classical communication channels;
quantum communication is needed only in the distribution stage. To accept the message, Bob checks Alice’s private
key against his measurement record for the message m. He accepts the message if he finds fewer than Lsa mismatches,
where sa is an authentication threshold and L is the length of the sequences chosen by Alice.
If Bob wishes to forward the message, he sends the message together with Alice’s private key to Charlie. Charlie
then checks for mismatches in the same way as before, but applies a different verification threshold sv, which is larger
than sa. The message is only accepted if there are fewer than Lsv mismatches. It is important that the threshold for
accepting a message directly from Alice is different from the threshold for accepting a forwarded message. Otherwise
Alice could repudiate with high probability [6]. Signing a message uses up the distributed signatures, which cannot be
reused.
Here, as for all existing QDS protocols, we assume that none of the participants are tampering with or eavesdropping
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FIG. 1: (Color online). Experimental setup for kilometer-range quantum digital signatures. Alice uses a pulsed 850 nm wavelength
vertical cavity surface emitting laser (VCSEL) diode to generate coherent states. She encodes her phase shift by using a lithium
niobate (LiNbO3) phase modulator, choosing randomly between the four possible phases. Alice sends the coherent states through
standard telecommunications optical fiber to the receivers, who then measure the received coherent states. Sender and receivers are
constructed from 4.4 µm core diameter polarization-maintaining optical fiber to improve the interferometric visibility. Polarization
routing of modulated signal and unmodulated reference was carried out using polarization dependent beam splitters (PBS), and
static polarization controllers (SPCs) were used to correct for polarization shift induced by birefringence in the telecommunications
fiber.
on the quantum channels between other participants. It is expected this assumption could be removed by using a
parameter estimation procedure analogous to that used in QKD [26]. By declaring (sacrificing) some of the states
sent during the distribution stage, participants should be able to estimate the level of eavesdropping, aborting if it is
too high. When considering security against forging by either Bob or Charlie, one assumes that the other recipient
and Alice are honest, since no protocol can guarantee security if two of the three parties are dishonest and collude.
Similarly, when considering security against repudiation by Alice, one assumes that Bob and Charlie are honest.
All pairwise classical communication in the present protocol, just as for QKD, must be authenticated. Pairwise
message authentication can in modern cryptography be efficiently implemented using “short” pre-shared keys [27]. It
is not, even in principle, possible to prevent man-in-the-middle-attacks in QKD or QDS schemes unless there has been
some prior interaction between parties. If information-theoretic security is required, one needs to use an appropriate
authentication scheme for all classical communication [28]. The security analysis for the QDS protocol implemented
here proceeds much as in Collins et al. [13] and is detailed in the Appendix.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In Figure 2, we plot experimental data and parameters for a range of mean photon numbers |α|2 sent by Alice.
When |α|2 increases, the probability that a forger will be able to select the correct declaration increases, but likewise
does an honest recipient’s ability to detect mismatches in a fake declaration. It is therefore highly non-trivial to
determine the optimal value of |α|2. The gap, g, between the probability for a forger’s fake declaration to be rejected
and the probability for Alice’s true declaration to be rejected, i.e. g =Cmin − ph (see the Appendix), depends on |α|2
and we choose the optimal value of |α|2 that maximises g. Other experimental parameters such as system loss and
interferometric visibility are also taken into account in the cost matrices that are used to obtain Cmin and thus the gap
g. It can be seen from Figure 2(c) that maximum gap occurs around |α|2 = 0.4 for transmission distances of 500 m,
1000 m and 2000 m, showing that this value of |α|2 is the best choice for the sender in this particular experimental
implementation.
For the desired security level, the length required to sign one half-bit can then be calculated using
3
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FIG. 2: (Color online). Experimental results and calculated parameters for one of the recipients, Bob. In our experiment, measure-
ment statistics for Bob and Charlie was very similar. a) Conditional probabilities for unambiguous state elimination by Bob, with
|α|2 = 0.5. These probabilities are used to calculate the gap g and the required signature length per half-bit. b) the time required for
Alice to send a half-bit to Bob. c) The gap achieved in the experiments is a calculated from a combination of information from both
receivers’ cost matrices. d) The length L required to prevent forging and repudiation, per half-bit of message, for a security level of
0.01%. For all sub-figures at 500 m, mean photon number points of 0.1, 0.9 and 1 have been removed. Here, the combination of
count rate and the dead time of the detector led to non-linearity in the detection.
P(protocol failure) = 2e−(g/4)
2L (see the Appendix). In this paper, we have used a security level of 0.01%. The
resulting signature length for each half-bit is graphed in Figure 2(d) for varying |α|2. As |α|2 increases, the length per
half-bit dips to a minimum and increases again. For our experimental data, the maximum value for the gap and the
minimum values for the length are around |α|2 = 0.4.
To further illustrate the measurements by the recipients, experimental success rates are shown in Figure 3. A
successful USE measurement means eliminating any state except the state Alice sent. On average, the USE success
rate is 80% of the raw count rate. Only a single detection event is required to eliminate a state, and therefore the
success rate is higher than for unambiguous state discrimination (USD), where one has to eliminate all possible states
except the one sent. The success rate for USD is typically many orders of magnitude lower than the time-gated detector
count rate [13]. The failure rate of USE (eliminating the state that was actually sent) depends on the visibility of the
interferometers formed by Alice’s state preparation and the receiver’s detection setup. In the security proof we assume
that Alice has full control over the failure rate and so can generate any number of mismatches she likes. For these
experiments, the USE failure rate was on average 1.7% of the pulse repetition rate. Knowing Alice’s repetition rate
and the signature length L required to sign a half-bit message allows us to calculate the time it would take for Alice to
send one half-bit using the current system.
IV. DISCUSSION
In a previous QDS experiment using quantum state elimination and a mulitport [13], with a transmission distance
of 5 m, the largest gap was found to be 1.20× 10−6, which occurred for |α|2 = 1. The USE success rate was 2× 105
counts per second. For a security level of 0.01%, the length L required to securely sign a half-bit was found to be
5.0× 1013, and the estimated time it would take to securely sign a half-bit was over eight years. In contrast, for the
present setup and a transmission distance of 500 m, the maximum gap, g = 2.86×10−4, occurs at a |α|2 = 0.5, with a
USE success rate of 2.48×106 . This gap is two orders of magnitude greater than for the previous short-range system.
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FIG. 3: (Color online). Unambiguous state elimination (USE) success rate at different transmission distances for Bob. Results for
Bob and Charlie are again very similar so only results for Bob are shown. The failure rate of USE is on average only 1.7% of the
pulse-repetition frequency and is not plotted. For transmission distance 500 m, points for mean photon number 0.1, 0.9 and 1 have
been removed, since here, the combination of count rate and the dead time of the detector led to non-linearity in the detection of
events.
The length L per half-bit for this new realization is 1.93× 109 for a security level of 0.01%, and the estimated time it
would take to securely sign a half-bit is less than 20 seconds. As the transmission distance increases, the time taken to
sign one half-bit naturally increases, but even at 2000 m the time taken to sign one half-bit is four orders of magnitude
smaller than in the previous experimental demonstrations of QDS.
The system reported in this letter operates over relatively short distances when compared to the current maximum
transmission distances achieved for QKD experiments [29] ˙Quite apart from the increased losses of 2.2 dbkm-1 ex-
perienced in the standard telecommunications fibre quantum channel at the wavelength of 850 nm selected for these
experiments as opposed to 0.2 dbkm-1 at the wavelength of 1550 nm typically used in the QKD experiments, this
letter reports a QDS protocol and it is to previous experimental QDS systems that it must be compared. In particular,
because of differences in the security analysis, one would not expect, a-priori, that the exact same physical implemen-
tation leads to comparable distances of QKD and QDS protocols.
Although the new protocol demonstrated in this paper shows a significant enhancement in transmission distance and
message signing rate compared with previous QDS demonstrations, further improvements in signature transmission
rate, in particular, will be necessary to fully exploit the potential of QDS. The largest scope for improvement seems
to lie in having Alice send different sequences of states to Bob and Charlie. This reduces each participant’s ability to
forge, while retaining security against repudiation due to the exchange of measurement outcomes performed by Bob
and Charlie [26].
The recently proposed signature protocol “P2” in [20] uses standard QKD systems to first generate pairwise shared
keys between all parties. The secret keys are then used to sign messages. Currently, such schemes seem more efficient
than any proposed quantum protocol that directly signs a message without first distilling a secret key. Nevertheless,
“direct” quantum signature protocols, such as the one discussed in this paper, are still worth investigating, as they may
eventually prove better than signature protocols based on secret shared keys. For example, direct quantum protocols
can remain secure even if the available quantum channels are too noisy for practical QKD [26]. The most efficient
direct quantum protocol should intuitively be at least as efficient as protocols proceeding via first distilling shared secret
keys, and then using the shared keys to sign messages. There could also be other advantages with direct quantum
protocols. If quantum channels of sufficiently high quality are available, then direct quantum signature protocols
should need quantum channels only between the sender and each recipient, as opposed to QKD links between each
party for protocols similar to P2. This means that the number of quantum channels scales only linearly with the number
of recipients for direct quantum signature schemes, as opposed to quadratically for schemes similar to P2. Compared
with work on QKD, very little work has been done on QDS schemes. This is surprising, given the wide usage and
5
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importance of signature schemes in modern communication. We are confident that demonstrating kilometer-range
quantum signature schemes, using the same technical components as QKD, will stimulate wider interest in developing
the next generation of quantum signature protocols for real-world optical networks.
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APPENDIX
I. PROTOCOL
The protocol presented in this paper is similar to P1’ from reference [20], but with two important differences. First,
we require Bob and Charlie to record whether each measurement outcome they hold came directly from Alice or
whether it was forwarded to them by the other recipient. Second, the experiment uses weak coherent states instead
of true single-photon states. This means that the security proofs presented for protocol P1’ do not apply, and instead
we follow the methods applied in [13] for security against individual and collective forging attacks. The protocol is as
follows:
A. Distribution Stage
1. For each future one-bit message k = 0,1, Alice generates two copies of sequences of coherent states,
QuantSigk =
⊗L
l=1 ρkl where ρkl = |bkl α〉〈bkl α|, α is a real positive amplitude, bkl ∈ {1, i,−1,−i} are randomly
chosen and L is a suitably chosen integer (the signature length). The state QuantSigk and the sequence of
numbers PrivKeyk = (bk1, ...,bkL) are called the quantum signature and the private key, respectively, for message
k.
2. Alice sends one copy of QuantSigk to Bob and one to Charlie, for each possible message k = 0 and k = 1.
3. Bob and Charlie measure each state received using quantum unambiguous state elimination (USE) for
{|α〉, |iα〉, | −α〉, | − iα〉}. For every element of each quantum signature (for k = 0,1), they store which de-
tectors detected photons; each detector rules out one possible phase state. They therefore store sets of six
numbers (hexaplets) of the form {k, l′,ak,l′0 ,ak,l
′
pi/2,a
k,l′
pi ,a
k,l′
3pi/2}, where 1 ≤ l
′ ≤ L and ak,l
′
φ ∈ {0,1}. Here, a
k,l′
φ = 0
means that no photons were detected at the ¬φ detector (that is, the phase φ is not ruled out), while ak,l′φ = 1
means that there was at least one photon detected at the ¬φ detector (that is, the phase φ is ruled out for this
element). By ¬φ detector we symbolise the “not φ” detector. Note that, due to losses, many of the hexaplets
will have ak,l
′
φ = 0 for all φ .
4. Once all states have been received and all hexaplets recorded, Bob and Charlie each independently choose half
(L/2) of their hexaplets and send them to the other participant. To do this, they use a secret classical channel so
that Alice has no information regarding which participant holds which hexaplet. Bob and Charlie keep a record
of whether a particular hexaplet came from Alice or whether it was forwarded by the other recipient.
B. Messaging Stage
1. To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends (m,PrivKeym) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
2. Bob checks whether (m,PrivKeym) matches both of his stored sequences – the one he received directly from
Alice, and the one he received from Charlie. In particular, he counts the number of elements of PrivKeym which
disagree with his stored hexaplets. Therefore, for a given element l of the signature, if Alice’s declaration was
φ , Bob needs to check if aφ is 0 or 1. If aφ = 1, he registers one mismatch. In other words, a mismatch is
registered whenever Alice’s declaration for a given element has been eliminated by Bob’s USE measurement.
Bob checks, for each of his stored sequences, whether the number of mismatches is below saL/2, where sa is
an authentication threshold. Bob accepts the message only if both of his sequences have fewer than saL/2
mismatches, i.e. both the sequence received directly from Alice, and the sequence received from Charlie.
3. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to Charlie the pair (m,PrivKeym) he received from Alice.
Charlie tests for mismatches similarly to Bob, but to protect against repudiation by Alice, he uses a different
threshold. For each of his sequences – the one received directly from Alice and the one received from Bob –
Charlie checks if the number of mismatches is below svL/2, where sv is the verification threshold, with sa < sv.
Charlie accepts the message only if both of his sequences have fewer than svL/2 mismatches.
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II. SECURITY
The quantum signature protocol is designed to be secure against two types of dishonesty: forging and repudiation.
Security against forging requires that any participant receiving a message will, with high probability, reject a message
that did not originate with Alice. Security against repudiation requires that, with high probability, Alice cannot make
Bob and Charlie disagree on the validity of her message, i.e. she cannot make one participant accept and the other
reject her message. In this section we will show that the probabilities of forging and repudiation decay exponentially in
the signature length, L. Further, we will show that the protocol is robust, i.e. if all participants are honest, the protocol
works and does not abort, except with a probability exponentially small in L.
For forging one can distinguish different types of malicious attacks. In individual attacks, the cheating party employs
a strategy separately and independently for each signature element. In collective attacks, there may be classical
correlations between strategies for different signature elements. Coherent attacks are the most general type; here a
cheating party can employ any type of correlations, including entanglement and measurements in an entangled basis.
Note that the same distinctions apply in principle to repudiation attempts from Alice. However, when proving security
against repudiation we will assume that Alice can exactly control the number of mismatches her signature generates
with Bob’s and Charlie’s measurement outcomes. This covers all types of attack from Alice and so the distinction
between individual, collective and coherent attacks is not made. Security is proven for all types of repudiation attacks,
and all types of forging except coherent forging attacks. We will treat individual forging attacks in detail. Security
against collective forging attacks then follows because the optimal collective forging strategy is actually an individual
strategy, as argued in [13].
A. Model Assumptions
Here, as in all previous QDS protocols, we assume that the quantum channels between participants do not allow
tampering or eavesdropping from a third party. It is expected that this assumption could be removed by using a
parameter estimation procedure analogous to that used in QKD [26]. By sacrificing part of the states sent during the
distribution stage, participants should be able to estimate the level of tampering and eavesdropping.
All pairwise classical communication in the present protocol, just as for QKD, must be authenticated. Pairwise
message authentication can be efficiently implemented with information-theoretic security using short pre-shared keys
[11]. Without this authentication, it is not possible, even in principle, to prevent “man-in-the-middle” attacks in QKD
or QDS schemes . Thus neither QKD nor QDS can be implemented without some prior interaction between parties.
It is important to note that pairwise authentication between parties is far simpler to achieve than an authenticated
broadcast channel.
B. Security Against Repudiation
To repudiate, Alice aims to send a declaration (m,Sigm) which Bob will accept and which Charlie will reject. To
do this, Bob must accept both the elements that Alice sent directly to him, and the elements that Charlie forwarded to
him. In order for Charlie to reject he need only reject either the elements he received from Alice, or the elements Bob
forwarded to him. Intuitively, security against repudiation follows because of the symmetrisation of measurement out-
comes performed by Bob and Charlie using the secret classical channel. Bob and Charlie perform USE measurements
on each of the states sent to them by Alice so that they hold the L hexaplets (b1, ...,bL) and (c1, ...,cL) respectively.
We give Alice full powers and assume that later on, in the messaging stage, she is able to fully control the number
of mismatches her signature declaration, PrivKeym, contains with the hexaplets (b1, ...,bL) and (c1, ...,cL). Call the
mismatch rates eB and eC respectively. The symmetrisation process means that Bob and Charlie will randomly (and
unknown to Alice) receive L/2 of the others’ hexaplets. We show that all choices of eB and eC lead to an exponentially
decaying probability of repudiation.
Suppose Alice chooses eC > sa. In this case, Bob is selecting (without replacement) L/2 elements from the set
{c1, ...,cL}, which contains exactly eCL mismatches with Alice’s declaration. The number of mismatches Bob selects
then follows a hypergeometric distribution H(L,eCL,L/2) with expected value eCL/2. For the message to be accepted,
Bob must select fewer than saL/2 errors. The tails of a hypergeometric distribution can be bound, using [30], to give
an inequality with the same form as a Hoeffding Inequality. We bound the probability that Bob selects fewer than
saL/2 mismatches as
P(Bob receives fewer than saL/2mismatches from Charlie)≤ exp(−(eC − sa)2L).
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To repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message, which means that Bob must accept both the part received from
Alice and the part received from Charlie. Since P(A∩B) ≤ min{P(A),P(B)}, the probability of repudiation must be
less than or equal to the above expression, and so must also decrease exponentially.
Now suppose eC ≤ sa. In this case, if eB > sa the above argument shows that it is highly likely that Bob will reject
the message, so we consider only the case where eB ≤ sa. Consider first the set {b1, ...,bL}. We can use the same
arguments as above to bound the probability of selecting more than svL/2 mismatches as
P(Charlie selects more than svL/2mismatches from Bob)≤ exp(−(sv− eB)2L).
For Alice to successfully repudiate, Charlie must select more than svL/2 mismatches from either the set {b1, ...,bL} or
the set {c1, ...,cL}. Using P(A∪B)≤ P(A)+P(B), we can see that, for the choice of eB,eC ≤ sa, we have
P(Charlie selects more than svL/2 mismatches)≤ 2exp(−(sv− sa)2L).
So again, the probability of Alice successfully repudiating decreases exponentially in the size of the signature. Similar
to [20], Alice’s best strategy would be to pick eB = eC = 12 (sv + sa), in which case
P(Repudiation)≤ 2exp
(
−
1
4
(sv − sa)
2L
)
. (1)
C. Security Against Individual and Collective Forging
In order to forge, Bob must make a declaration with fewer than svL/2 errors with the L/2 elements Charlie received
directly from Alice. To bound the probability of Bob being able to make such a declaration, we will follow the cost
matrix analysis performed in [13]. For a given individual signature element, we define the cost matrix for Bob as
a matrix where the rows correspond to which state Alice sent (|exp(iθ )α〉), while the columns correspond to the
detectors D(¬θ ). Each matrix element Ci, j can be taken equal to the probability that if the i’th state is sent, then
Charlie’s j’th detector clicks. This is because Bob should avoid declaring a phase that Charlie has eliminated. His
cost for making a particular declaration will therefore be proportional to the probability that Charlie has ruled out this
state. When |α|2 = 0.4, and over a distance of 500m, the experiment gives us the cost matrix
C =


8.41× 10−5 1.48× 10−3 2.00× 10−3 1.11× 10−3
1.15× 10−3 6.31× 10−5 1.22× 10−3 2.84× 10−3
2.41× 10−3 1.90× 10−3 1.53× 10−4 1.30× 10−3
1.15× 10−3 2.77× 10−3 1.15× 10−3 4.49× 10−5

 . (2)
From this matrix, we aim to find two important quantities. First, we want to find the honest cost, ph, for Bob. This
is the rate at which Charlie would find mismatches even if Bob acts honestly. This situation occurs when Charlie
erroneously rules out the state that Alice actually sent. The experimentally found probability of this happening is
given by the diagonal elements of C, and so the honest cost is simply the average of the diagonal elements, giving
ph = 8.61× 10−5. This rate is important for two reasons: first, the parameter sa must be set higher than ph for the
protocol to be robust (to avoid aborting due to noise in the honest run); second, to be secure against forging ph must
be smaller than the rate at which Charlie finds mismatches if Bob is dishonest, i.e. being dishonest must carry some
positive cost for Bob.
We now consider the case of a dishonest Bob who tries to guess Alice’s signature so that he can forge a message to
Charlie. We consider only individual and collective forging attacks, where Bob acts on each quantum state individually,
but the outcome of his measurement on one quantum state can affect his choice of measurement on the others. Security
against coherent forging attempts remains an open question. We want to find Cmin, the minimum possible rate that Bob
will declare single signature elements which have been eliminated by Charlie. To do this, we use the cost matrix C
and note that Cmin is the minimum cost associated with the matrix C. Finding minimum costs involves finding optimal
measurements, which is in general a difficult problem. However, we are able to bound Cmin following the method in
[13]. To do this, we find the matrices Ch, C′ and Cl , with
Ch =


8.41× 10−5 8.41× 10−5 8.41× 10−5 8.41× 10−5
6.31× 10−5 6.31× 10−5 6.31× 10−5 6.31× 10−5
1.53× 10−4 1.53× 10−4 1.53× 10−4 1.53× 10−4
4.49× 10−5 4.49× 10−5 4.49× 10−5 4.49× 10−5

 .
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This is a constant-row matrix made up of the diagonal elements of the matrix C. The minimum cost achievable for this
matrix is the honest cost, ph. The matrix
C′ =


0 1.40× 10−3 1.92× 10−3 1.02× 10−3
1.09× 10−3 0 1.15× 10−3 2.78× 10−3
2.26× 10−3 1.75× 10−3 0 1.15× 10−3
1.11× 10−3 2.72× 10−3 1.11× 10−3 0


is the difference between C and Ch. It represents the difference between an honest strategy and a dishonest strategy.
The minimum cost for this matrix is the minimum additional cost suffered from acting dishonestly. It is difficult to
find the minimum cost for this matrix, so instead we can bound it below by reducing all non-zero elements to the the
smallest non-zero element, to get the matrix
Cl =


0 1.02× 10−3 1.02× 10−3 1.02× 10−3
1.02× 10−3 0 1.02× 10−3 1.02× 10−3
1.02× 10−3 1.02× 10−3 0 1.02× 10−3
1.02× 10−3 1.02× 10−3 1.02× 10−3 0

 .
The matrix Cl corresponds to a lower bound on the additional probability Bob has of causing a mismatch if he is
dishonest, when compared to the honest case. For this reason we define the constant, non-zero element, as guad, the
guaranteed advantage an honest strategy has over a dishonest strategy. Since Chi j +Cli j ≤ Ci j, the minimum cost of
Ch +Cl must be less than the minimum cost of C. The matrix Cl is of error-type, so its minimum cost is proportional
to pmin(α), the minimum error probability, and can be achieved using a minimum-error measurement [19]. Since the
optimal measurement is known, in this case, to be the SRM, we can calculate pmin(α) for all values of α from:
λ1 = 2e−|α |
2 (
cos
(
|α|2
)
+ cosh
(
|α|2
))
λ2 = 2e−|α |
2 (
sin
(
|α|2
)
+ sinh
(
|α|2
))
λ3 = 2e−|α |
2 (
cosh
(
|α|2
)
− cos
(
|α|2
))
λ4 = 2e−|α |
2 (
sinh
(
|α|2
)
− sin
(
|α|2
))
pmin(α) = 1−
1
16
∣∣∣∣∣∑i
√
λi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
Defining the gap, g = pmin×guad, we know ph +g ≤Cmin. For the particular case of |α|2 = 0.4, pmin = 0.317 and
we get
ph + g = 8.61× 10−5+(0.317× 1.02×10−3) = 4.10× 10−4 ≤Cmin.
This is our lower bound on Cmin and in what follows we conservatively assume Cmin = ph + g. As long as we choose
sv <Cmin, we can use [31] to obtain
P(Forge)≤ exp(−(Cmin − sv)2L). (3)
Note that for simplicity we have only considered the case of Bob attempting to forge. We should also consider
the possibility of Charlie trying to forge. In this case, we would replace the cost matrix (2) with the corresponding
experimentally generated cost matrix for Charlie. The analysis then follows exactly as above and we would arrive at
another value of Cmin, valid for when Charlie is the forger. For the protocol to be secure against both Bob and Charlie
attempting to forge, we would choose Cmin = min{CBobmin ,CCharliemin }. For our implementation, CBobmin <CCharliemin and so Cmin
remains as above.
D. Robustness
Suppose all parties are honest. Bob aborts if either the (1/2)L states received from Alice result in mismatch rate
greater than sa or the measurement results for the (1/2)L states received from Charlie give mismatch rate greater than
10
Experimental demonstration of kilometer-range quantum digital signatures
sa. We suppose that the channel from Alice to Bob has an error rate of pBh and the channel from Alice to Charlie has
an error rate of pCh . Then we have
P(Abort due to Alice)≤ exp(−(sa − pBh)2L)
P(Abort due to Charlie)≤ exp(−(sa − pCh )2L).
If we set ph = max(pBh , pCh ) then the probability of an honest abort is bounded by
P(honest abort)≤ 2exp(−(sa− ph)2L). (4)
E. Signature Length
Using the above analysis, we can calculate the length of the signature needed to securely sign a single-bit message.
Following [13], we assume that there is no reason in general to favour one type of security over another, so we pick
parameters sa and sv so as to make the probabilities of honest abort, forgery and repudiation all equal. If all these
probabilities are all below 0.01%, we say that the protocol is secure to a level of 0.01%. By setting
sa = ph + g/4, sv = ph + 3g/4, (5)
the probabilities of repudiation, forging, and honest abort all become approximately equal. More explicitly, consider-
ing the terms in the exponent of equations (1), (3), (4), we see they are equal when
(
sv− sa
2
)2
−
ln(2)
L
= (Cmin − sv)2 = (sa − ph)2−
ln(2)
L
, (6)
where the pre-factors of 2 have been taken inside the exponential. As L increases, the choice of sa and sv satisfying (6)
tends to those given in (5).
Determining the value of the coherent state amplitude, α , that leads to the smallest possible signature length is, in
general, a difficult problem. Higher values of |α|2 lead to lower loss and a smaller bit error rate, but come at the cost
of making the states {|α〉, |iα〉, |−α〉, |− iα〉} more distinguishable for a potential forger. Thus we need to strike a
balance between correctly transmitting the states, and giving power to a forger. In the previous QDS experiment [13],
the magnitude of α was varied in increments of 1 between 1 and 10. In order to minimise the signature length, the
magnitude of α is chosen so as to maximise the gap, g, defined above. It was found that |α|2 = 1 gave the largest
gap for the range considered, and extrapolation of subsequent experimental data suggested that |α|2 ≈ 0.5 would be
optimal. In fact, we found in this experiment that the optimal value was around |α|2 = 0.4, for which the corresponding
pmin value is 0.317.
We now have everything in place to calculate the signature length, L, needed to securely sign a message for |α|2 =
0.4. Over a distance of 500m, experimental data gives the honest cost as ph = max(pBh , pCh ) = 1.26× 10−4. Note that
this differs from the value used in the analysis above because in fact Charlie’s cost matrix gave a higher honest cost
than Bob’s. We also find Cmin = min{CBobmin ,CCharliemin } = 4.10× 10−4, as above. This gives the gap, g = Cmin − ph =
2.84× 10−4, from which we can find the parameters sa,sv using (5). Putting it all together, we find that a signature
length of L = 1.96× 109 is required to sign a message to a security level of 0.01%.
Although this is a significant improvement over the last QDS experiment [13], there are a number of ways to further
improve the efficiency of the protocol. The simplest would be to increase the clock rate and therefore the transmission
rate. This would not decrease the signature length, but would decrease the time needed to transmit a given signature
length. The pulse rate used in this QDS system was 100MHz, and there is scope to increase this to >1GHz as is
typically found in modern QKD systems [22, 32–34]. Despite the clock rate increasing by a factor of 10, the increased
effects of inter- and intra- symbol interference mean that the corresponding decrease in the signature time will not be
as great as a a factor of 10. The exact improvement strongly depends on the characteristics of the employed coherent
source, single-photon detectors and timing electronics.
Another possible improvement would be to switch to an operational wavelength of 1550nm as in [32], rather than
the 850nm used in this experiment. At 1550nm, we would expect to see losses of about 0.22 dB per kilometer, a
significant improvement over the 2.2 dB per kilometer in the current setup. This switch in wavelengths would enable
a new QDS experiment to be carried out over 10’s of kilometers with similar performance to our QDS system at short
distances. A wavelength of 850nm was selected for these experiments as it provides a good compromise between
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the detection efficiency response of the mature low-noise, lowing timing-jitter, high efficiency thick junction silicon
single-photon avalanche diodes at room temperature and the attenuation profile of fused silica optical fibres.
As the system used in these experiments is similar in layout to that used in a number of QKD experiments, we can
make an approximate comparison of the performance of our QDS system with that of a state-of-the-art QKD system
[32] by examining the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Reducing the QBER would decrease the size of the diagonal
elements in the cost matrix (2). This would lead to a larger gap, g, and therefore a smaller signature. There is perhaps
less scope for improvement in this respect since the current setup achieved a QBER of around 4% over the range
of distances investigated, which is comparable to the QKD system in [32] where the QBER at 50km was 3.85%.
The differing achievable transmission distances between the work presented here and reference [32] being due to the
increased loss of the fused silica optical fibres for light with a wavelength of 850nm.
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
The experimental system shown in Figure 1 of the main paper, shares many similarities with common phase-basis-
set QKD experiments [21–25, 35]. The main components are similar to our previous unambiguous state elimina-
tion (USE) QDS system, with the multiport removed [13]. The sender Alice and receivers Bob and Charlie are all
constructed from 4.4µm core diameter “panda-eye” polarization maintaining fiber [36] that can support two orthog-
onal linear polarization modes. Alice generates 850.17nm wavelength coherent-state pulses at a repetition rate of
100MHz by means of an electrically gain-switched vertical cavity surface-emitting laser (VCSEL) and a motorised
optical attenuator [13]. A Lithium Niobate (LiNbO3) phase modulator is used to encode the phases on weak pulses; a
strong reference pulse is delayed by half a period from the encoded states. The uncertainty in the phase encoding is
±1.6× 10−6 rad, primarily induced by amplitude jitter in the electrical driving signal. The signal and reference pulses
have orthogonal linear polarizations and are efficiently recombined using a polarisation beam combiner (PBC) [37]
before transmission through the 9µm core diameter optical fiber quantum channel. The quantum channel is composed
of reels of Corning SMF-28e optical fiber [38] that were retained within the same laboratory as Alice, Bob and Char-
lie. Short lengths of 4.4µm core diameter fiber [39] are spliced onto the input and output of the quantum channel to
eliminate higher order spatial modes [40].
Mechanical and thermal stresses induced on the quantum channel will result in a time-evolving birefringence in the
quantum channel that serves to reduce the linearity of the polarizations as they propagate. Bob and Charlie employ
paddle-type static polarisation controller (SPC) to apply an opposing birefringence over a short (≈1m) length of 4.4µm
core diameter fiber, returning the states to linear prior to the measurement step. This correction is applied manually
once before a set of measurements are recorded and is monitored during operation, with realignment when necessary.
Future revisions of this system will employ automatic correction of polarization evolution by means of monitoring a
fraction of the delayed bright reference pulse.
A polarization beam-splitter in each receiver ensures that the weak signal pulse traverses the long path with the
5ns delay while the bright reference pulse traverses the short path. The polarization and intensity of the reference
pulse are altered to match the signal pulse before the two pulses are recombined on a final 50:50 beam combiner (BC)
where they interfere. USE [18] is used to eliminate some possible phases for the signal states [13]. Commercially
available free-running Geiger-mode (photon-triggering) [41] silicon single-photon avalanche diodes (Si-SPADs) [42]
are employed as detectors, because they have reasonable detection efficiency (≈40%) for photons with a wavelength of
850nm, a low dark count rate (≈300Hz) and a low afterpulsing probability (≈0.5%) when compared to semiconductor
detectors used at the telecommunications wavelengths [43, 44]. Although superconducting detectors have exhibited
detection efficiencies of 93% [45] such devices typically must be cooled to temperatures around 4 K with cryogens
or large closed cycle coolers [46] during operation while semiconductor technologies usually operate at near room
temperature with Peltier coolers [42, 44]. There have been recent advances in semiconductor single-photon detector
technologies for wavelengths around 1550 nm [44] and it is likely that future QDS experiments over Corning SMF-28e
optical fiber [38] will employ these technologies to further enhance the transmission range. Detector trigger events are
time-stamped with time interval resolution of 1ps using commercially available electronics [47]. Technical limitations
of interfacing and computer control meant that the maximum event rate that could be recorded by the receivers was
approximately 4MHz. The time-stamping electronics require a 10MHz reference signal that is provided by common
rubidium clock that is shared between Alice and the receivers.
The air-gaps in each receiver consist of an immobile launching collimating lens and a collection lens attached to a
linear piezo-electric-actuator with a total travel of≈1.5µm in steps of≈15nm. The receivers adjust the relative lengths
of their measurement setup to ensure optimum interferometric visibility (typically 93%). The receivers’ demodulation
systems had a mean attenuation of 6.96 dB.
Analysis of the raw time-stamp information is carried out by custom software written in MATLAB [48]. The time-
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stamps are filtered to discard those that occur outside of a window of ±2ns centred on the expected arrival time of a
pulse a process that retains 80% on average of the raw counts. The non-gated counts are from background noise, dark
counts and non-interfering pulses. The custom software examines the detector firing patterns to perform USE. The
measurement records are then retained to allow for subsequent forwarding of measurement results from Bob to Charlie
and vice versa. This step needs to be done in secret from Alice, and could thus be accomplished using a standard QKD
link between Bob and Charlie; this was however not implemented in the current setup.
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